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ABSTRACT 
During the last 15–20 years, inequality between Russian regions in terms of real personal 
incomes per capita was decreasing. This paper aims at revealing the “anatomy” of this 
phenomenon. To do so, time series of every regional income per capita is tested for catching-up 
with the national income per capita. Nonlinear asymptotically subsiding trends model the 
processes of convergence. The data cover 2002–2018 with a monthly frequency. Real incomes 
are estimated by adjusting nominal incomes to regional price levels. The results obtained suggest 
that 54.4% of the Russian regions exhibit convergence, and 20.3% of regions retain 
(approximately) stable income gap. At the same time, there is a significant proportion of 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
One of main issues of regional policy is that of regional inequality in the level of welfare 
essentially characterized by income per capita. An important question in this regard is whether 
the inequality tends to decrease over time. In fact, this question can be easily answered. It 
suffices to trace the evolution of some inequality indicator (standard deviation of log income, 
coefficient of variation, Gini index, etc.) and find its trend, i.e. to analyze the so called “sigma-
convergence.” An econometric exercise called “beta-convergence” is superfluous. It adds 
nothing if sigma-convergence exists and – because of Galton’s fallacy (Quah, 1993) – can yield 
wrong results if it does not.   
Anyway, results regarding countrywide convergence are rather poor, being of the kind “all 
or nothing.” It is much more interesting and important to find the role of every individual region 
of the country in this process, in other words, to reveal its “anatomy.” It seems reasonable to 
assume that the process of convergence is heterogeneous. Regions for sure differ in convergence 
rates; a part of them may not converge, having zero convergence rates. It is not inconceivable 
that there are regions with the deviant dynamics, i.e. divergence. Therefore, only a spatial pattern 
of convergence can provide a basis for reasonable, region-specific, policy implications. 
This paper aims at revealing the “anatomy” of income convergence in Russia. During the 
last 15–20 years, inequality between Russian regions in terms of real personal incomes per capita 
was decreasing; the Gini index fell from 15.1% in 2002 to 11.1% in 2018. To find the role of 
individual regions in this process, time series of regional income per capita are tested for 
catching-up with the national income per capita. Nonlinear asymptotically subsiding trends 
model the processes of convergence. The data cover 2002–2018 with a monthly frequency. Real 
incomes are estimated by adjusting nominal personal incomes per capita to regional price levels.  
The results obtained suggest that 54.4% of the Russian regions exhibit convergence, and 
20.3% of regions retain stable (on average) income gap. At the same time, there is a significant 
proportion of deterministically diverging regions, equaling 22.8%. Random walks are detected in 
two regions only. 
Publications on regional income inequality and convergence in Russia number in the tens. 
Gluschenko (2011) reviews a portion of them prior to 2010. Therefore, only some more recent 
studies are quoted here. Many of them use the regional GDP per capita as the income indicator, 
yielding contradictory results. Lehmann and Silvagni (2013), using data for 1995–2010 and beta-
convergence, sigma-convergence, and distribution dynamics methodologies, find no evidence of 
convergence. Akhmedjonov et al. (2013) test stationarity of the gap between regional and 
national GDP per capita in 2000–2008 for every region, thus deeming a common trend in these 
two series to be an indication of convergence. They reveal so defined convergence in only 13 out 
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of 79 regions, although conditional beta-convergence does hold. Durand-Lasserve and 
Blöchliger (2018) find conditional beta-convergence over 2005–2015. Lehman et al. (2020) 
exploit a modified version of conditional beta-convergence and also find convergence even over 
a longer period, 1996–2017 – in contrast to the earlier study, Lehmann and Silvagni (2013). 
Carvelli (2020) considers the period 1994–2015 and discovers that beta-convergence is 
accompanied by divergence in differences between the regional incomes and their sample 
average. Tochkov (2021) applies the distribution dynamics approach. With the use of data over 
1994–2015, he finds divergence to prevail with the movement from the middle income level to 
the top and bottom levels.  
The next portion of studies deals with personal income per capita as the income indicator. 
Guriev and Vakulenko (2012) explore convergence of personal incomes per capita and wages 
over 1995–2010, adjusting them to regional price levels by regional subsistence levels. Their 
results suggest that unlike the 1990s, when Russian regions did not converge or even diverge, 
convergence in incomes and wages occurred in the 2000s (accompanied by non-convergence in 
GDP per capita). Ivanova (2014) deals with the period 1996–2012, finding conditional beta-
convergence of incomes adjusted for price levels by the regional cost of a fixed basket since 
2002 and regional CPI for earlier years. World Bank Group (2017) reports conditional beta-
convergence over 2004–2015.  
All considered papers, except for Akhmedjonov et al. (2013), deal with the convergence 
process as a whole, not discriminating individual regions. It is worth noting that it is typical for 
the literature on income convergence in general; studies that discriminate individual economies 
(regions or countries) are very rare.  
This paper contributes to the literature in two aspects. First, it demonstrates methodology 
of straightforward modeling convergence in the time series context. Second, it obtains a spatial 
pattern of income convergence of Russian regions in the 2000s, that is, reveals the evolution of 
income in every region with respect to the national average. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes methodology 
applied. Section 3 considers the data and gives an aggregated characterization of the evolution of 
real regional incomes per capita. Section 4 reports and discusses the results of the empirical 
analysis. Section 5 summarizes the study. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY    
Currently, the very notion of convergence in the time-series context is ambiguous. It had 
definitely meant catching-up in the literature on economic growth until, apparently, Bernard and 
Durlauf’s (1995) paper caused confusion in this notion. Oxley and Greasley (1995) even propose 
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to discriminate between catching-up and long-run convergence. 
Consider the income gap between two economies: yrst = yrt – yst = log(Yrt/Yst), where Yrt and 
Yrt are incomes per capita in economies r and s, t denoting time. Bernard and Durlauf (1995) put 
forward a formal definition of convergence: economies r and s converge if the long-term forecast 
of income per capita (conditional on information available by the moment of forecast, I) are 





.          (1) 
Despite this definition of convergence is general, procedures of testing applied by Bernard 
and Durlauf (1995) in fact detect only a partial class of processes satisfying the definition, 
namely, stationary processes with no trend. This implies that yrt and yst have a common trend, or, 
in other terms, that these time series are cointegrated with cointegrating vector (1, – 1). It is 
worth noting that in this case series yrst satisfies the condition of weak stationarity which is much 
narrower than Bernard and Durlauf’s own definition. Since then (apparently) stationarity of 
income gap started to be considered as an indication of convergence in many studies.   
From the viewpoint of common sense, it seems natural to mean by convergence a process 
of approaching economies to each other, narrowing the income gap between them, i.e. catching-
up. It is illogical to call “convergence” a case when the income gap does not narrow, remaining 
on average stable, albeit with deviations from the average from time to time.       
So, the term “convergence” means catching-up in what follows. A convergence process is 
in fact a superposition of two processes that can be called long-run, or deterministic, 
convergence, and short-run, or stochastic convergence: yrst = y
*
rst + dyrst. The long-run 
convergence is a deterministic part of the income gap that tends to zero over time as Formula (1) 
requires:  y
*
rst = h(t), where h(t) is an asymptotically subsiding trend such that  h() = 0 and 
dh(t)/dt < 0. (To economize notation, the economy indices are suppressed somewhere.) Short-
run convergence is an autocorrelated stochastic process containing no unit root, i.e. a stationary 
process dyrst = ( + 1)dyrs,t–1 + t, where  + 1 =  < 1 is the autoregression coefficient, and t is 
the Gaussian white noise. (It is this process that Oxley and Greasley, 1995, call “long-run 
convergence,” referring to the above superposition – albeit with a linear trend – as “catching-up.”)  
Intuitively, the short-run convergence characterizes the behavior of transient random 
shocks. A unit shock deflects the income gap from its long-run path, dying out over time with 
half-life  = ln(0.5)/ln( + 1), so that the deflection eventually vanish. Thus, the superposition of 
long-run and short-run convergences is a process that is stationary around an asymptotically 
subsiding trend h(t). That is, albeit random shocks force the process to deviate from the 
deterministic trend, it permanently tends to return to the trend, thus satisfying condition (1). 
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Since dyrs,t–1 = yrs,t–1 – h(t –1), we get the following econometric model of convergence: 
yrst = h(t) – ( + 1)h(t – 1) + yrs,t–1 + t,       (2) 
where  is the first difference operator.     
Similarly to the half-life time of random deviations from the long-run path, the semi-
convergence time of the deterministic income disparity, , can be defined as the time the 
(percentage) disparity takes to halve, that is, Yr,t+/Ys,t+ – 1 = (Yrt/Yst – 1)/2. It can be computed 
from the following equation: h(t + ) = log(0.5(eh(t) + 1)). 
The same Model (2) describe a process of divergence if dh(t)/dt > 0. It is also a process 
that is stationary around trend h(t); however, the trend is a rising one. In this case,  is the 
doubling time, i.e. the time the disparity takes to double: Yr,t+/Ys,t+ – 1 = 2(Yrt/Yst – 1). Here,  
h(t + ) = log(2eh(t) – 1). Note that such a process is a superposition of short-run convergence 
and long-run (deterministic) divergence. Hence, it fundamentally differs from stochastic 
divergence which is a non-stationary process (random walk). 
This study uses three modes of trend h(t). The first one is the log-exponential trend h(t) = 
log(1 + et),  < 0; the second is the exponential trend h(t) = et,  < 0; and the third is the 
fractional trend h(t) = /(1 + t),  > 0. The respective nonlinear econometric models have the 
forms: 
yrst = log(1 +et) – ( + 1)log(1 + e(t – 1)) + yrs,t–1 + t;     (2a) 
















      (2c) 
Table 1 reports initial disparities, Yr0/Ys0 – 1, and semi-convergence and doubling times in 
terms of the model parameters. As these times for the exponential and fractional trends depend 
on t, the table reports them for halving/doubling the initial disparity. If e

  0.5 with diverging 
exponential or fractional trend, the doubling time should be computed with  replaced by its 
absolute value (which means the permutation of indices r and s in yrst). 
 
Table 1. Interpretation of the model parameters 









































































   
Non-convergence occurs when the income gap does not change over time. Such a process 
can be also characterized as a superposition of two processes: short-run convergence and time-
invariant long-run path h(t) = . Substituting this “trend” into Equation (2), the conventional 
AR(1) model with a constant is arrived at: 
yrst =  + yrs,t–1 + t,          (3) 
where  = –.  
Ignoring random shocks, this case implies a proportional change in incomes: Yrt = cYst with  
c = e

. Alternatively, incomes in r and s (in the logarithmic terms) have the same trends shifted by 
a constant: yrt = yst + . 
An important particular case of non-convergence is that of  = 0, i.e. the long-run path of the 
income gap is h(t) = 0. Thus, only short-run convergence remains, generating the conventional 
AR(1) model with no constant: 
yrst = yrs,t–1 + t.          (4) 
This means that there is no income gap between the economies under consideration. 
Accurate to random shocks, Yrt = Yst, or incomes in r and s have a common trend. This implies that 
convergence as such has completed by the moment t = 0, the income gap fluctuating around the 
income parity. Nonetheless, it is this process that is deemed convergence in numerous papers, 
Bernard and Durlauf (1995) among these. 
The empirical analysis in this study follows the general-to-specific approach. That is, 
Model (2) is estimated and tested at first. If it proves not valid, the analysis proceeds with Model 
(3). In turn, Model (4) is analyzed if Model (3) is rejected. In the case that no one model proves 
valid, the conclusion is that a process under consideration is a random walk. 
All three versions of Equation (3) are estimated for each time series, selecting a version 
that provides the best fit (the minimal sum of squared residuals) if they turn out to be completive. 
In the unit root test and test for statistical significance of parameters  and , 10% is accepted as 
the critical level. 
Testing the unit root hypothesis, H0:  = 0 (against  < 0), applies the Phillips-Perron (PP) 
test with the OLS autoregressive spectral method. This makes it possible to avoid size distortions 
that arise because of the use of kernel-based spectral density estimators (Perron and Ng, 1996). 
The lag length selection bases on the modified Bayesian (Schwarz) information criterion with a 
sample-dependent penalty factor (proposed by Ng and Perron, 2001). Besides, the effective 
number of observations is held fixed when estimating the auxiliary OLS regression with different 
lag lengths, according to Ng and Perron (2005). The unit root test statistics, t-ratio of ,  = /, 
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for models with nonlinear trends are non-standard and not tabulated. To obtain their empirical 
distributions under the null hypothesis,  in models (2a), (2b), and (2c) were estimated over 1 
million random walks yt = yt–1 + t. 
      
3. DATA 
The Russian Federation consists of constituent units (republics, oblasts, one autonomous 
oblast, krais, autonomous okrugs, and federal cities) termed federal subjects. Despite different 
designations, all these are equal in legal terms. In this study, a federal subject (including federal 
cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg) is meant by a region, “composite” federal subjects (that 
include autonomous okrugs) being considered as single wholes. The spatial sample covers 79 
regions, all Russia’s regions – as of 2002 – but the Chechen Republic that lacks full time series. 
The time span covers January 2002 to December 2018 with a monthly frequency (204 
points in time). The use of the monthly data is motivated by the fact that the number of annual 
observations would be insufficient for time-series analysis. Annual data used for aggregate 
characterizations below are averages of monthly indicators over a respective year. 
Studies on regional income inequality frequently involve regional GDP per capita. 
However, this indicator is not an adequate characterization of population’s welfare, rather 
reflecting economic performance of regions (even so, it can be distorted, though, because of 
mismatch between regions where companies actually work and where they are registered). The 
point is that the final household consumption is typically only a part of regional GRP. However, 
due to social transfers from the federal budget, it can even exceed GRP in some regions. In 2018, 
the ratio of final household consumption to GRP varied across Russian regions from 15% to 
130% (excluding in-kind transfers; computed from Rosstat, 2020, pp. 490-491, 509, 511). 
Therefore, this study uses personal incomes per capita which directly relate to population’s 
welfare.   
To provide comparability of incomes across regions, they should be adjusted to regional 
price levels; it is so adjusted income that is referred to as real income in this study. Regional 
consumer price indices (CPI) are not suitable for this purpose. The point is that the CPI 
weighting schemes vary across regions, which makes CPI not comparable across regions. There 
is an alternative indicator in the Russian statistics, the cost-of-living index. It bases on the same 
set of goods and services as CPI; but, in contrast, the respective basket is uniform for all regions 
of the country. However, some features of this index prevent its use. First, the cost-of-living 
index is by city, and not by region (this is surmountable, thou; aggregating for regions is easy 
albeit time-consuming). Second, the index is annual, and not monthly. And third, the cost-of-
living index has been introduced only since 2009. Therefore, a different indicator is used as a 
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proxy of regional price level, namely, the monthly cost of fixed basket of consumer goods and 
services for inter-regional comparisons of population’s purchasing power (hereafter, simply 
“fixed basket”). This basket includes 83 goods and services and is uniform across regions and 
time. It is less representative than the cost-of-living index which covers 275 items. However, a 
comparative study in Gluschenko and Karandashova (2017) suggests that the cost of the fixed 
basket provides a satisfactory accuracy of estimating real incomes. 
So, the regional income per capita is the ratio of nominal income per capita in a region to 
the cost of the fixed basket in this region. The same relates to the national real income per capita. 
The Russian statistics estimates personal income per capita in the country as the weighted 
average of regional incomes; the same is valid for the national cost of the fixed basket. The 
variable to be analyzed is relative real income per capita in a region. It is the ratio of regional 
real income per capita to the national income per capita. In terms of the previous section this 
means that index s in yrst is fixed, corresponding to Russia as a whole.  
The data source is the Russian statistical agency, Rosstat. Nominal incomes per capita by 
region are drawn from: Rosstat (2002–2007) for 2002–2007, Rosstat (2014) for 2008, Rosstat 
(2016a) for 2009–2012, Rosstat (2016b) for 2013–2015, and for 2016–2019, EMISS (2020a) for 
2016–2019. The costs of the fixed basket by region are drawn from EMISS (2020b). They are 
available since 2002, hence the beginning of the time span of the study. Its end is determined by 
the fact that the data on personal incomes by region are published with a quarterly (and not 
monthly) frequency since 2019.     
Let us consider characterizations of the data. Figure 1 shows the evolution of different 
estimates of real incomes in Russia.  
 





















































































































































































































                                                 National income per capita, deflated by CPI 
                                                 National real income 
                                                 Arithmetic mean of regional real incomes 
 
Figure 1. Real incomes in Russia 
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The left panel of Figure 1 plots annual averages of monthly incomes depicted in the right 
panel. The real national income per capita is estimated in three ways. First, the nominal income 
per capita in the county as a whole is divided by the national CPI (this estimate seems the most 
exact). Second, the national real income per capita is the ratio of the nominal income to the cost 
of the fixed basket. Third, the real income is computed as the arithmetic mean of regional real 
incomes. Quantitatively, these estimates do not coincide; however, their behavior is the same 
qualitatively. It suggests that the real income in the country progressively rose till 2013. Since 
2014, it started falling. In 2018, the regional average suggests further fall, while two other 
estimates show a minor rise. The reason is that increases in real incomes in more populated 
regions have exceeded decreases in less populated (and more numerous) regions. The arithmetic 
mean does not capture this, attaching equal weights to all regions. Turning to the right panel of 
Figure 1, it is seen that the real  income is highly volatile (the same is true for the nominal 
income). It follows a sawtooth trajectory. Every December, personal incomes skyrocket because 
of yearly bonuses, repayment of wage arrears, etc. In January, incomes regularly fall because of 
10-day New Year holidays and shortage of wage funds caused by additional payments in the 
previous month. Moreover, both additional payments and shortages considerably differ across 
regions, increasing income dispersion.    
Figure 2 reports the distribution of regional real incomes per capita related to the national 
real income in the initial and final years of the time span under consideration. Despite the 
histogram for 2002 is seemingly bimodal, so causing a suspect of convergence clubs, a test for 
multimodality (Fischer et al., 1994) does not corroborate this suspect. It rejects the hypothesis of 
more than one mode with confidence (the same is true for other years). Comparing 2002 and 
2018, some indications of convergence are seen. The outliers of 2002 have shifted to the main 
body of the distribution by 2018. These were Moscow City (2.34 in 2002 and 1.33 in 2018), the 
Tymen Oblast (1.75 and 1.15), and Republic of Komi (1.34 and 0.91). The most poor regions 
became richer, leaving the income class [0.3, 0.4) empty. These regions were the Republic of 
Ingushetia (0.31 in 2002 and 0.57 in 2018) and Ivanovo Oblast (0.44 and 0.77). However, there 
are indications of divergence as well. For instance, a sole region in the class of the most poor in 
2018, the Republic of Tuva, with its relative income of 0.48, had income of 0.62 in 2002. In 
general, the mean of the distribution changed from 0.80 to 0.86 and the median increased from 
0.76 to 0.83, so approaching the national average. At the same time, the standard deviation 
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Figure 2. Distribution of regional real incomes per capita 
       
Figure 3 provides more detailed pattern of the descriptive statistics. It plots their evolution 
over the whole time span for monthly relative incomes and their annual averages.  
 





















































































































































































































                                                             Mean (left scale) 
                                                             Standard deviation (right scale) 
 
Figure 3. Descriptive statistics of regional real incomes related to the national average 
 
While the evolution of the standard deviation also suggests the overall tendency to income 
convergence, it shows that this process is not permanent. Since 2015, income dispersion slowly 
rose (except for the final year of the time span). The mean reached its peak in 2015 and started 
decreasing then. This evidences that regions were becoming on average poorer since 2016. 
At last, let us consider the income dynamics directly in terms of inequality. Figure 4 plots 





































































































































Figure 4. Regional income inequality in Russia 
 
Figure 4 also unambiguously suggests convergence of regional real incomes. The regional 
inequality measured by the annual Gini index decreased from 0.151 in 2002 to 0.111 in 2018. 
However, convergence seems to stop after 2012, having reached the annual value of 0.107. After 
that, the inequality started rising, albeit very slowly. 
Based on the preliminary analysis in the section, we can expect processes of convergence 
to be widespread among regions of the country. Along with this, it is probable that divergence 
occurs in some regions as well.    
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 2 tabulates the results of the econometric analysis. Recall that convergence of 
regional real income per capita to the national one is analyzed. For every region, the table reports 
a model that the most adequately describes the time series of income gap between the region and 
Russia as a whole, coefficient estimates, and results of testing for unit root. For Models (2a), 
(2b), and (2c), the semi-convergence or doubling time is also reported (the bold font marking the 










Table 2. The pattern of income convergence  




 / in (3)   , 
years
1. Rep. of Karelia (2b) –0.462 (0.059) 0.000 –0.103
*** (0.013)   0.0052*** (0.0009) 12.0
2. Rep. of Komi  (2a) –0.336 (0.053) 0.000   0.430*** (0.094) –0.0246*** (0.0064) 2.3
3. Arkhangelsk Obl. (2b) –0.387 (0.056) 0.000 –0.131*** (0.013) –0.0035* (0.0018) 17.4
4. Vologda Obl. (2b) –0.301 (0.051) 0.000 –0.164
*** (0.027)   0.0021* (0.0013) 31.2
5. Murmansk Obl. (3) –0.344 (0.053) 0.000 –0.012* (0.007)   
6. St. Petersburg City (3) –0.419 (0.057) 0.000   0.078*** (0.012)   
7. Leningrad Obl. (2c) –0.374 (0.055) 0.003 –0.544*** (0.051)   0.0101*** (0.0024) 10.8
8. Novgorod Obl. (2b) –0.502 (0.060) 0.000 –0.355*** (0.028) –0.0073*** (0.0010) 9.0
9. Pskov Obl. (3) –0.651 (0.065) 0.000 –0.201*** (0.021)   
10. Kaliningrad Obl. (2c) –0.452 (0.059) 0.000 –0.454*** (0.034)   0.0100*** (0.0019) 10.5
11. Bryansk Obl. (2b) –0.711 (0.069) 0.000 –0.456*** (0.015) –0.0077*** (0.0004) 8.8
12. Vladimir Obl. (2b) –0.400 (0.057) 0.000 –0.557*** (0.026) –0.0038*** (0.0005) 18.6
13. Ivanovo Obl. (2b) –0.534 (0.063) 0.000 –0.973*** (0.027) –0.0077*** (0.0004) 10.4
14. Kaluga Obl. (2a) –0.406 (0.058) 0.000 –0.419*** (0.022) –0.0123*** (0.0012) 4.7
15. Kostroma Obl. (2b) –0.789 (0.070) 0.000 –0.437*** (0.016) –0.0042*** (0.0004) 16.2
16. Moscow City (2b) –0.552 (0.064) 0.000   0.956*** (0.026) –0.0067*** (0.0003) 6.0
17. Moscow Obl. none       
18. Oryol Obl. (2b) –0.448 (0.059) 0.000 –0.320*** (0.023) –0.0040*** (0.0008) 16.1
19. Ryazan Obl. (2b) –0.674 (0.066) 0.000 –0.436*** (0.022) –0.0045*** (0.0006) 14.8
20. Smolensk Obl. (3) –0.775 (0.069) 0.000 –0.161*** (0.015)   
21. Tver Obl. (2c) –0.357 (0.054) 0.008 –0.488*** (0.032)   0.0060*** (0.0012) 17.6
22. Tula Obl. (2b) –0.379 (0.055) 0.000 –0.355*** (0.030) –0.0079*** (0.0011) 8.3
23. Yaroslavl Obl. (3) –0.412 (0.057) 0.000 –0.051*** (0.008)   
24. Rep. of Mariy El  (2c) –0.595 (0.065) 0.000 –0.737*** (0.025)   0.0058*** (0.0006) 20.8
25. Rep. of Mordovia (2c) –0.443 (0.059) 0.001 –0.541*** (0.025)   0.0019*** (0.0005) 56.5
26. Chuvash Rep.  (2c) –0.461 (0.060) 0.000 –0.466*** (0.020)   0.0013*** (0.0004) 82.1
27. Kirov Obl. (2c) –0.483 (0.060) 0.000 –0.498*** (0.028)   0.0049*** (0.0009) 21.8
28. Nizhni Novgorod Obl. (2b) –0.261 (0.047) 0.004 –0.306*** (0.047) –0.0141*** (0.0030) 4.6
29. Belgorod Obl. (2b) –0.200 (0.042) 0.098 –0.425*** (0.116) –0.0239*** (0.0081) 2.8
30. Voronezh Obl. none       
31. Kursk Obl. (2b) –0.496 (0.062) 0.000 –0.430*** (0.025) –0.0127*** (0.0011) 5.3
32. Lipetsk Obl. (2b) –0.433 (0.058) 0.000 –0.254*** (0.045) –0.0203*** (0.0049) 3.1
33. Tambov Obl. (2b) –0.292 (0.049) 0.000 –0.286*** (0.032) –0.0047*** (0.0012) 13.6
34. Rep. of Kalmykia  (2b) –0.574 (0.064) 0.000 –0.913*** (0.032) –0.0015*** (0.0003) 51.5
35. Rep. of Tatarstan  (2a) –0.513 (0.062) 0.000   0.050
*** (0.012)   0.0076*** (0.0016) 7.6
36. Astrakhan Obl. (3) –0.299 (0.049) 0.000 –0.053*** (0.009)   
37. Volgograd Obl. (2c) –0.354 (0.052) 0.005 –0.189
*** (0.017) –0.0020*** (0.0004) 22.6
38. Penza Obl. (2c) –0.428 (0.059) 0.004 –0.557*** (0.039)   0.0088*** (0.0016) 12.6
39. Samara Obl. (2c) –0.468 (0.060) 0.000 –0.006
* (0.003) –0.0048*** (0.0001) 8.8
40. Saratov Obl. (2c) –0.601 (0.065) 0.000 –0.377*** (0.015)   0.0021*** (0.0005) 47.4
41. Ulyanovsk Obl. (2c) –0.361 (0.056) 0.013 –0.485*** (0.039)   0.0079*** (0.0018) 13.4
42. Rep. of Adygeya  (2b) –0.188 (0.040) 0.057 –0.792*** (0.093) –0.0077*** (0.0015) 9.8
43. Rep. of Dagestan (2b) –0.246 (0.046) 0.000 –0.869*** (0.150) –0.0219*** (0.0049) 3.5
44. Rep. of Ingushetia (2a) –0.536 (0.063) 0.000 –0.769*** (0.020) –0.0045*** (0.0004) 12.8
45. Kabardian-Balkar Rep.  (3) –0.345 (0.053) 0.000 –0.137*** (0.022)   
46. Karachaev-Cirkassian Rep. (2c) –0.615 (0.066) 0.000 –0.410
*** (0.012) –0.0014*** (0.0002) 38.5
47. Rep. of Northern Ossetia  (3) –0.630 (0.065) 0.000 –0.148*** (0.016)   
48. Krasnodar Krai (2b) –0.237 (0.046) 0.032 –0.446*** (0.078) –0.0137*** (0.0033) 4.9
49. Stavropol Krai (2b) –0.389 (0.056) 0.000 –0.502*** (0.021) –0.0038*** (0.0004) 18.3
50. Rostov Obl. (3) –0.265 (0.048) 0.000 –0.048*** (0.009)   
51. Rep. of Bashkortostan  (4) –0.317 (0.052) 0.000     
52. Udmurt Rep.  (2b) –0.529 (0.063) 0.000 –0.447*** (0.018) –0.0059*** (0.0005) 11.4
53. Kurgan Obl. (3) –0.221 (0.044) 0.035 –0.074*** (0.015)   
54. Orenburg Obl. (2c) –0.651 (0.067) 0.000 –0.404*** (0.021)   0.0099*** (0.0013) 10.3
55. Perm Krai (4) –0.415 (0.058) 0.000     
56. Sverdlovsk Obl. (2a) –0.375 (0.052) 0.000   0.092
*** (0.021)   0.0039** (0.0016) 14.7
57. Chelyabinsk Obl. (2c) –0.268 (0.048) 0.036 –0.040
*** (0.013) –0.0040*** (0.0005) 10.7
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 / in (3)   , 
years
58. Rep. of Altai (2c) –0.532 (0.062) 0.000 –0.470
*** (0.025) –0.0010*** (0.0003) 53.3
59. Altai Krai (2b) –0.576 (0.064) 0.000 –0.470*** (0.021) –0.0030*** (0.0005) 22.7
60. Kemerovo Obl. (2c) –0.283 (0.049) 0.038 –0.022
*** (0.007) –0.0046*** (0.0001) 9.1
61. Novosibirsk Obl. (2a) –0.313 (0.049) 0.000 –0.237*** (0.025) –0.0032*** (0.0011) 18.2
62. Omsk Obl. (2c) –0.459 (0.056) 0.000 –0.007
** (0.003) –0.0048*** (0.0001) 8.8
63. Tomsk Obl. (2b) –0.464 (0.059) 0.000 –0.099
*** (0.013)   0.0053*** (0.0009) 11.8
64. Tyumen Obl. (2b) –0.415 (0.057) 0.000   0.540*** (0.026) –0.0069*** (0.0006) 6.9
65. Rep. of Buryatia (2b) –0.344 (0.053) 0.000 –0.378*** (0.035) –0.0034*** (0.0009) 19.5
66. Rep. of Tuva  (2c) –0.752 (0.069) 0.000 –0.578
*** (0.021) –0.0007*** (0.0003) 81.8
67. Rep. of Khakasia  (3) –0.642 (0.066) 0.000 –0.222*** (0.024)   
68. Krasnoyarsk Krai (2c) –0.377 (0.056) 0.006 –0.059
*** (0.011) –0.0031*** (0.0006) 13.9
69. Irkutsk Obl. (2c) –0.382 (0.055) 0.006 –0.124
*** (0.011) –0.0030*** (0.0003) 15.0
70. Transbaikal Krai (2c) –0.344 (0.051) 0.004 –0.567*** (0.053)   0.0147*** (0.0031) 7.5
71. Rep. of Sakha (Yakutia)  (3) –0.506 (0.062) 0.000 –0.020*** (0.006)   
72. Jewish Autonomous Obl. (2c) –0.595 (0.065) 0.000 –0.362
*** (0.013) –0.0009*** (0.0002) 57.0
73. Chukotka AO (4) –0.378 (0.054) 0.000     
74. Primorsky Krai (2b) –0.626 (0.066) 0.000 –0.493*** (0.019) –0.0064*** (0.0005) 10.7
75. Khabarovsk Krai (2b) –0.410 (0.057) 0.000 –0.167*** (0.028) –0.0041** (0.0018) 14.9
76. Amur Obl. (2b) –0.319 (0.051) 0.000 –0.560*** (0.047) –0.0074** (0.0011) 9.5
77. Kamchatka Krai (3) –0.620 (0.065) 0.000 –0.148*** (0.017)   
78. Magadan Obl. (2c) –0.625 (0.065) 0.000   0.016
*** (0.006) –0.0045*** (0.0002) 9.1
79. Sakhalin Obl. (2c) –0.233 (0.045) 0.081   0.042
*** (0.014) –0.0042*** (0.0004) 9.7
Notes: 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. 2. Asterisks ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 3.  in bold font means doubling time in cases of divergence. 4. ‘Obl.’ = Oblast, ‘Rep.’ = 
Republic, and ‘A.O.’ = Autonomous Okrug. 
 
As expected, convergence is a prevailing type of regional income dynamics. It occurs in 43 
regions out of 79, or in 54.4% of regions. In most of them (40 regions), real incomes were below 
the national income. Thus, the most part of regional convergence in 2002–2018 consisted of 
faster income growth in poorer regions. In three regions, convergence leaded to a decrease in 
relative real incomes. These regions were the richest in the country in 2002 (see the left panel of 
Figure 2). However, as a result, the real income in the Republic of Komi felt below the national 
one. In fact, this implies divergence. Model (2) is not able to detect such kind of divergence, as 
the asymptotically subsiding trends cannot intersect the zero line.  
Non-convergence takes place in 16 regions (20.3%). In 13 regions, real incomes changed 
proportionally to the national one, so that their income gap remained on average constant. Out of 
them, the real income was higher than the national average in Saint-Petersburg only. Thus, 12 
regions permanently remained relatively poor with no improvement in the situation. Three 
regions had real income on average equal to the national one. Surprisingly, the Chukotka 
Autonomous Okrug, the most remote northern region of the country is among them. The point is 
that Model (4) describes the income dynamics on average over 17 years. In fact, the real income 
in Chukotka exceeds the national level since about 2010. 
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Figure 5. Spatial pattern of regional income convergence in Russia. 
Note: See Table 2 for numerical designations of regions.  
 











































































A significant proportion of regions, more than one fifth (22.8%), prove to diverge. Out of 18 
deterministically diverging regions, only four had real income exceeding the national one (the 
Republic of Tatarstan, Sverdlovsk, Magadan, and Sakhalin oblasts). Real incomes in these regions 
grew further. Other 14 regions became progressively poorer (albeit very slow in some cases, with 
the doubling time of several decades).   
There are two cases classed as random walks. In the Voronezh Oblast, the relative income 
approached the national level, however, in an irregular way. The relative income in the Moscow 
Oblast was below the national one till 2005 and rose after that. Thus, the evolution of income is a 
combination of convergence and divergence there, which Model (2) cannot capture.  
Taking account of greatly diverse natural conditions of Russian regions, the total 
equalization of real incomes cannot be a goal of the social policy in the country. At least, in the 
northern regions, real incomes should be above the national level, so compensating unfavorable 
natural conditions. From this viewpoint, income divergence is not unambiguously a negative 
phenomenon. It plays a positive role in the Magadan, and Sakhalin oblasts, possibly eventually 
providing adequate compensating differentials. Wage compensating differentials do take place in 
the northern regions, in Siberia, and the Russian Far East. However, they are not sufficient, as 
Figure 5 suggests (with the above reservations). In general, the geographical pattern of the 
income distribution is far from satisfactory. In the most of northern regions (not speaking about 
more southern Siberian and Far Eastern regions), the real income only approaches to the national 
level or stagnates on the level below the national average. In 2018, only four such regions had 
real income exceeding the national level by more than 5% (the Tyumen, Magadan, and Sakhalin 
oblasts, and Chukotka Autonomous Okrug).          
 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper employs time series of incomes per capita across Russian regions over 2002–
2018 with a monthly frequency to reveal a spatial pattern of converging regional incomes to the 
national level. Incomes are adjusted to the regional price levels in order to capture actual 
differences in well-being of regions’ population. Nonlinear asymptotically subsiding trends 
model processes of convergence. The same models with nonlinear trends can detect divergence. 
Non-convergence in the sense of a constant (including zero) income gap is modeled by ordinary 
AR(1) models with no trend.  
The results obtained suggest that in general the income dynamics in the country was 
positive. A significant portion of regions – more than a half – converged to the national level, for 
the most part from lower to higher income per capita relative to the national average.  
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At the same time, in many regions real incomes stagnated at levels below the national 
average. What is worse, not small number of regions diverged, becoming progressively poorer. 
The geographical distribution of income seems far from satisfactory. Namely, many regions that 
should have higher incomes compensating unfavorable natural conditions are in fact below the 
national level. 
As regards policy implications, the pattern obtained provides a basis for region-specific 
implications. These need a more deep analysis of reasons for low income (and its further 
decrease in the case of divergence) in relevant regions and developing measures to overcome 
unfavorable income dynamics.      
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